What Drives Poor Care for Child Diarrhea: A Standardized Patient Experiment
试验速览
- 阶段
- 不适用
- 状态
- 已完成
- 发起方
- RAND
- 入组人数
- 2,451
- 试验地点
- 1
- 主要终点
- Received or prescribed antibiotic
研究概览
简要总结
Diarrhea is the second leading cause of death for children around the world, although nearly all of these deaths could be prevented with an inexpensive and simple treatment: oral rehydration salts (ORS). Many children with diarrhea do not receive ORS when they seek treatment and this study uses a field experiment to examine why this occurs. We will use anonymous standardized patients combined with a randomized ORS supply intervention to isolate the causal effect of several potential reasons for why children do not receive ORS when they seek care: 1) caretakers prefer ORS alternatives, 2) providers have a financial incentives to prescribe ORS alternatives, and 3) ORS is often out of stock.
详细描述
Diarrhea is the second leading cause of death for children around the world. This is true despite the fact that nearly all such deaths could be prevented with a simple and inexpensive solution: oral rehydration salts (ORS). Private health care providers, who treat the majority of childhood illness in low- and middle-income countries (LMICs), are particularly unlikely to dispense ORS to children with diarrhea. Instead, providers often dispense antibiotics inappropriately. Recognizing this significant challenge, several international organizations (including USAID) have invested heavily in trying to increase ORS dispensing in the private sector. In the absence of evidence on why ORS is so inconsistently dispensed by private providers, however, several interventions to promote private sector ORS dispensing have been ineffective. Clearly, a critical and urgent next step is to examine the key drivers of underprescription of ORS and overprescription of antibiotics in the private sector in order to inform efforts to improve diarrhea care. In this study, we examine several leading explanations for poor quality of care for child diarrhea in the private sector. First, patient preferences for ORS alternatives (e.g., an antibiotic) could be driving underprescription of ORS. We will identify the causal effect of patient preferences (Aim 1) by having anonymous standardized patients (SPs) pose as caretakers of children with diarrhea and express different (randomly assigned) preferences for treatment (ask for ORS, ask for antibiotics, or let provider decide). Second, private providers could be responding to financial incentives to sell more profitable alternatives to ORS (e.g., an antibiotic). To estimate the causal effect of financial incentives (Aim 2), we will instruct a subset of SPs to inform providers that they can get discounted treatments at a relative's drug shop. This eliminates the provider's financial incentive to recommend a given treatment and allows us to estimate the effect of such incentives. Finally, private providers might not directly distribute ORS or could have frequent stock-outs. To estimate the causal effect of stock-outs (Aim 3), we will randomly assign half of the providers to receive a three-month supply of ORS. This generates exogenous variation in stock outs and thus enables us to isolate the causal effect of stock outs on ORS and antibiotic prescribing. Combining, (a) causal estimates of the impact of each factor on prescribing, and (b) population estimates of the prevalence of each factor, will allow us to estimate the population level impact of implementing interventions that address each factor (Aim 4). This study will provide the most comprehensive evidence to date on why one of the most important health technologies in history is often not prescribed. The results will inform the design of interventions aimed at increasing ORS dispensing and reducing antibiotic dispensing. If such interventions are targeted appropriately, millions of young lives could be saved.
研究设计
- 研究类型
- Interventional
- 分配方式
- Randomized
- 干预模型
- Crossover
- 主要目的
- Treatment
- 盲法
- Triple (Participant, Care Provider, Outcomes Assessor)
盲法说明
The study participants are private health care providers in India who treat child diarrhea. Providers will be masked to which type of patient they are assigned to but not whether they receive free treatment for child diarrhea. Outcomes will assessed by anonymous standardized patients and these will be blind to whether the provider received free treatment for child diarrhea.
入排标准
- 年龄范围
- 18 Years 至 —（Adult, Older Adult）
- 性别
- All
- 接受健康志愿者
- 是
入选标准
- •Eligible providers will be private providers over 18 years old in our sampled villages that treat at least one case of child diarrhea per week
排除标准
- •Providers in villages where there are no other providers will be excluded for confidentiality concerns
研究组 & 干预措施
Free distribution of ORS + standardized patient with ORS preference
Providers assigned to this arm will receive 3 months supply of ORS. Roughly 4 weeks later, they will receive a visit from a standardized patient (outcomes assessor) who poses as a caretaker for their child with diarrhea and indicates a preference for ORS.
干预措施: Free distribution of ORS (Behavioral)
Free distribution of ORS + standardized patient with ORS preference
Providers assigned to this arm will receive 3 months supply of ORS. Roughly 4 weeks later, they will receive a visit from a standardized patient (outcomes assessor) who poses as a caretaker for their child with diarrhea and indicates a preference for ORS.
干预措施: Standardized patient with ORS preference (Behavioral)
Free distribution of ORS + standardized patient with Antibiotic preference
Providers assigned to this arm will receive 3 months supply of ORS. Roughly 4 weeks later, they will receive a visit from a standardized patient (outcomes assessor) who poses as a caretaker for their child with diarrhea and indicates a preference for Antibiotics.
干预措施: Free distribution of ORS (Behavioral)
Free distribution of ORS + standardized patient with Antibiotic preference
Providers assigned to this arm will receive 3 months supply of ORS. Roughly 4 weeks later, they will receive a visit from a standardized patient (outcomes assessor) who poses as a caretaker for their child with diarrhea and indicates a preference for Antibiotics.
干预措施: Standardized patient with Antibiotic preference (Behavioral)
Free distribution of ORS + standardized patient with no preference
Providers assigned to this arm will receive 3 months supply of ORS. Roughly 4 weeks later, they will receive a visit from a standardized patient (outcomes assessor) who poses as a caretaker for their child with diarrhea and indicates no preference for treatment.
干预措施: Free distribution of ORS (Behavioral)
Free distribution of ORS + standardized patient with no preference
Providers assigned to this arm will receive 3 months supply of ORS. Roughly 4 weeks later, they will receive a visit from a standardized patient (outcomes assessor) who poses as a caretaker for their child with diarrhea and indicates no preference for treatment.
干预措施: Standardized patient with no preference (Behavioral)
Free distribution of ORS + standardized patient with no preference + no financial incentive
Providers assigned to this arm will receive 3 months supply of ORS. Roughly 4 weeks later, they will receive a visit from a standardized patient (outcomes assessor) who poses as a caretaker for their child with diarrhea and indicates no preference for treatment and indicates that they will purchase whatever the provider recommends from a relative's drug shop.
干预措施: Free distribution of ORS (Behavioral)
Free distribution of ORS + standardized patient with no preference + no financial incentive
Providers assigned to this arm will receive 3 months supply of ORS. Roughly 4 weeks later, they will receive a visit from a standardized patient (outcomes assessor) who poses as a caretaker for their child with diarrhea and indicates no preference for treatment and indicates that they will purchase whatever the provider recommends from a relative's drug shop.
干预措施: Standardized patient with no preference + no financial incentive (Behavioral)
Status quo ORS supply + standardized patient with ORS preference
Providers assigned to this arm will have status who ORS supply. Roughly 4 weeks later, they will receive a visit from a standardized patient (outcomes assessor) who poses as a caretaker for their child with diarrhea and indicates a preference for ORS.
干预措施: Standardized patient with ORS preference (Behavioral)
Status quo ORS supply + standardized patient with Antibiotic preference
Providers assigned to this arm will have status who ORS supply. Roughly 4 weeks later, they will receive a visit from a standardized patient (outcomes assessor) who poses as a caretaker for their child with diarrhea and indicates a preference for Antibiotics.
干预措施: Standardized patient with Antibiotic preference (Behavioral)
Status quo ORS supply + standardized patient with no preference
Providers assigned to this arm will have status who ORS supply. Roughly 4 weeks later, they will receive a visit from a standardized patient (outcomes assessor) who poses as a caretaker for their child with diarrhea and indicates no preference for treatment.
干预措施: Standardized patient with no preference (Behavioral)
Status quo ORS supply + standardized patient with no preference + no financial incentive
Providers assigned to this arm will have status who ORS supply. Roughly 4 weeks later, they will receive a visit from a standardized patient (outcomes assessor) who poses as a caretaker for their child with diarrhea and indicates no preference for treatment and indicates that they will purchase whatever the provider recommends from a relative's drug shop.
干预措施: Standardized patient with no preference + no financial incentive (Behavioral)
结局指标
主要结局
Received or prescribed antibiotic
时间窗: 4 weeks after the ORS supply is dispensed. Same time as standardize patient visits occur.
Standardized patients will record whether the provider either dispensed or prescribed antibiotics for their child's diarrhea.
Received or prescribed ORS
时间窗: 4 weeks after the ORS supply is dispensed. Same time as standardize patient visits occur.
Standardized patients will record whether the provider either dispensed or prescribed ORS for their child's diarrhea .
Received or Prescribed ORS
时间窗: 4 weeks after the ORS supply is dispensed. Same time as standardize patient visits occur.
We will create a binary variable that indicates whether the provider either dispensed or prescribed ORS to standardized patients for their child's diarrhea. This variable will be set to 1 if the provider dispensed or prescribed ORS and to zero otherwise. The mean of this variable represents a probability.
Received or Prescribed Antibiotic
时间窗: 4 weeks after the ORS supply is dispensed. Same time as standardize patient visits occur.
We will create a binary variable that indicates whether the provider either dispensed or prescribed antibiotics to standardized patients for their child's diarrhea. This variable will be set to 1 if the provider dispensed or prescribed antibiotics and to zero otherwise. The mean of this variable represents a probability.
次要结局
- Received or prescribed zinc+ORS(4 weeks after the ORS supply is dispensed. Same time as standardize patient visits occur.)
- Received or prescribed ORS + zinc and no antibiotics(4 weeks after the ORS supply is dispensed. Same time as standardize patient visits occur.)
- Received or prescribed zinc(4 weeks after the ORS supply is dispensed. Same time as standardize patient visits occur.)
- Received or prescribed ORS and no antibiotics(4 weeks after the ORS supply is dispensed. Same time as standardize patient visits occur.)
- Received or Prescribed Zinc(4 weeks after the ORS supply is dispensed. Same time as standardize patient visits occur.)
- Received or Prescribed Zinc+ORS(4 weeks after the ORS supply is dispensed. Same time as standardize patient visits occur.)
- Received or Prescribed ORS and no Antibiotics(4 weeks after the ORS supply is dispensed. Same time as standardize patient visits occur.)
- Received or Prescribed ORS + Zinc and no Antibiotics(4 weeks after the ORS supply is dispensed. Same time as standardize patient visits occur.)