Evaluating a Landmine Action Ex-combatant Reintegration Program in Liberia

Poor and unemployed youth are widely considered a threat to political stability, often blamed for everything from fights to crime, riots and revolutions. Ex-combatants cause special worry. Not only do they have professional experience in warfare, and hence some comparative advantage in violence, but their social networks may also be dense with potential recruiters. War may also have left them poorer or more traumatized than their peers. Each of these factors could elevate the risk of rebellion, crime, or other aggression, risks greatest in weak states and uncertain economic climates like that of Liberia.

In response, policymakers commonly turn to employment and other poverty alleviation programs, including cash grants, vocational training, small business development, and microfinance. Underlying these programs is the belief that with economic opportunities come stability. When dealing with organized populations, such as former combatants, gang members, or criminal organizations, policymakers are also anxious to break down risky social networks, especially the links between commanders and foot soldiers. Interventions often go beyond simple employment programs, and seek to relocate, resettle, or otherwise remove high-risk individuals from risky networks.

This project evaluates a rehabilitation program for ex-combatants and other high-risk youth in Liberia, a unique case where it was both politically and practically feasible to establish and follow a random control group. The program we study, which was designed and implemented by the international non-governmental organization (NGO) Action on Armed Violence, is among the best of its class. The program is targeted towards ex-combatants and other high-risk populations in resource enclaves and other "hotspots" around the country. It provides extensive agricultural skills training and inputs alongside life skills training and resettlement assistance. Its objective is to reduce the risk of violence and aggression by providing an alternative, stable livelihood in civilian communities to youth otherwise engaged in illicit activities or thought to be easily mobilized into crime or violence. After observing two highly promising courses and classes of graduates, the researchers collaborated with the NGO to randomly evaluate their next round of classes at two training sites.

The program implementers confirmed that the number of youth eligible for the program exceeded program capacity by a factor of at least two. The sample size was limited to 2.5 times the number of spots in the program, for a total of 1500. In order to give all eligible youth an equal opportunity to participate, the program implementers determined entry into the program using a computerized randomization of eligible youth. Respondents were assigned to treatment and control using a randomization program coded in Stata. The sample was stratified by gender, "commander status," and community of registration.

The study has two principal rounds of data collection among both treatment and control groups: a baseline prior to the intervention and a follow-up survey approximately one year following completion of the program.