Transforming Primary Care Payment in Hawaii

Not Applicable

Active, not recruiting

• Conditions: Diabetes
• Interventions: Behavioral: New Payment Model; Behavioral: Social Comparisons; Behavioral: A1c Member/Provider Incentive

• Registration Number: NCT02731716
• Lead Sponsor: University of Pennsylvania

Brief Summary

To design an innovative payment system that improves upon fee-for-service (FFS), incorporates behavioral economic principles, and improves work satisfaction among primary care physicians (PCPs) while improving quality and reducing health spending at the state level. Second, to test the incremental effectiveness of two additional interventions: (1) shared financial incentives between physicians and poorly controlled diabetes and (2) social comparisons ranking physicians on quality metric performance and total cost of care.

Detailed Description

The goal of this project is to transform the Hawaii Medical Service Association (HMSA) primary care provider payment model to better incentive population health while bending the increasing trend of health spending in the state. Primary care and overall spending patterns will be studied to lay the foundation for a more rationally designed model. This model deliberately shifts away from FFS and includes three components: 1) a risk-adjusted per-member, per-month (PMPM) base payment, 2) an enhanced quality incentive program with larger bonus amounts and 3) a total cost of care incentive at the PO level. The aim is to build on the success of the Alternative Quality Contract (AQC) program implemented by Blue Cross Blue Shield (BCBS) of Massachusetts. While the AQC is used as a starting point, the study introduces and tests a number of innovations using concepts from behavioral economics. First, the move away from the FFS chassis to a PMPM-based capitated payment. Second, 20% of the PMPM payment is at-risk based on metrics designed to increase engagement between HMSA and physicians and engagement with performance feedback. Third, the number of metrics in the quality incentive program is drastically reduced from over 60 metrics to 10-12 per specialty. Fourth, the scoring of quality incentives incorporates rewards for improvement, rather than exclusively attainment of thresholds, to activate physicians along the entire performance distribution. In addition to implementing the new payment model, the initial experiment will include a test of two additional behavioral concepts: social comparisons for physicians and a shared incentive for physicians and poorly controlled diabetics tied to improve glycemic control.

Study Timeline

• Study First Submitted: 2016-03-28
• Study Start: 2016-04
• Study First Submitted QC: 2016-04-01
• Study First Posted: 2016-04-07
• Primary Completion: 2017-12
• Status Verified: 2024-08
• Last Update Submitted: 2024-08-06
• Last Update Posted: 2024-08-09
• Study Completion: 2025-07

Recruitment & Eligibility

• Status: ACTIVE_NOT_RECRUITING
• Sex: All
• Target Recruitment: 117

Inclusion Criteria

• HMSA physicians who are part of a Provider Organization that is participating in the payment transformation pilot.

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Exclusion Criteria

• Any physician who is not part of a participating Provider Organization.

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Study & Design

• Study Type: INTERVENTIONAL
• Study Design: PARALLEL

Arm && Interventions

Group	Intervention	Description
Social Comparisons	New Payment Model	Providers will no longer be paid based upon FFS, but on the new payment model. Providers will receive a PMPM payment for attributed members, a quality incentive payment based upon attainment of sixteen quality metrics, and a possible bonus payment for savings in total cost of care at the provider organization level. Providers will also receive weekly emails that will show comparisons of their own performance against their peers within the same provider organization on specific quality measures and total cost of care.
Social Comparisons	Social Comparisons	Providers will no longer be paid based upon FFS, but on the new payment model. Providers will receive a PMPM payment for attributed members, a quality incentive payment based upon attainment of sixteen quality metrics, and a possible bonus payment for savings in total cost of care at the provider organization level. Providers will also receive weekly emails that will show comparisons of their own performance against their peers within the same provider organization on specific quality measures and total cost of care.
New Payment Model	New Payment Model	Providers in the first arm will no longer be paid based upon FFS, but on the new payment model. Providers will receive a PMPM payment for attributed members, a quality incentive payment based upon attainment of sixteen quality metrics, and a possible bonus payment for savings in total cost of care at the provider organization level.
A1c Member/Provider Incentive	Social Comparisons	Providers will no longer be paid based upon FFS, but on the new payment model, which includes a PMPM payment for attributed members, a quality incentive payment based upon attainment of quality metrics, and a possible bonus payment for savings in total cost of care. Providers will also receive weekly emails that will show comparisons of their own performance against their peers within the same provider organization on specific quality measures and total cost of care. There is also a shared incentive between the member and the provider. The member incentive will be a payment made to diabetic patients with an A1C of greater than or equal to 9% who experience a reduction of at least 0.5%. Each participating member and PCP can receive up to $75 per quarter for A1C reduction.
A1c Member/Provider Incentive	New Payment Model	Providers will no longer be paid based upon FFS, but on the new payment model, which includes a PMPM payment for attributed members, a quality incentive payment based upon attainment of quality metrics, and a possible bonus payment for savings in total cost of care. Providers will also receive weekly emails that will show comparisons of their own performance against their peers within the same provider organization on specific quality measures and total cost of care. There is also a shared incentive between the member and the provider. The member incentive will be a payment made to diabetic patients with an A1C of greater than or equal to 9% who experience a reduction of at least 0.5%. Each participating member and PCP can receive up to $75 per quarter for A1C reduction.
A1c Member/Provider Incentive	A1c Member/Provider Incentive	Providers will no longer be paid based upon FFS, but on the new payment model, which includes a PMPM payment for attributed members, a quality incentive payment based upon attainment of quality metrics, and a possible bonus payment for savings in total cost of care. Providers will also receive weekly emails that will show comparisons of their own performance against their peers within the same provider organization on specific quality measures and total cost of care. There is also a shared incentive between the member and the provider. The member incentive will be a payment made to diabetic patients with an A1C of greater than or equal to 9% who experience a reduction of at least 0.5%. Each participating member and PCP can receive up to $75 per quarter for A1C reduction.

Primary Outcome Measures

Name	Time	Method
Improvement in Provider Performance	1 year	Provider performance on quality metrics will be compared across all three arms.

Secondary Outcome Measures

Name	Time	Method
Improvement in A1C among poorly controlled diabetics	6 Months	A1c levels will be compared across all three arms to see if there is a reduction in a1c in arm 3.
Primary Care Spending	1 year	Primary care spending in primary care providers will be compared across all three arms.